that line against
Richmond. For many reasons I was much opposed to such a plan, but
mainly because its execution would involve the opening of the Orange
and Alexandria railroad. To protect this road against the raids of
the numerous guerrilla bands that infested the region through which
it passed, and to keep it in operation, would require a large force
of infantry, and would also greatly reduce my cavalry; besides, I
should be obliged to leave a force in the valley strong enough to
give security to the line of the upper Potomac and the Baltimore and
Ohio railroad, and this alone would probably take the whole of
Crook's command, leaving me a wholly inadequate number of fighting
men to prosecute a campaign against the city of Richmond. Then, too,
I was in doubt whether the besiegers could hold the entire army at
Petersburg; and in case they could not, a number of troops sufficient
to crush me might be detached by Lee, moved rapidly by rail, and,
after overwhelming me, be quickly returned to confront General Meade.
I was satisfied, moreover, that my transportation could not supply me
further than Harrisonburg, and if in penetrating the Blue Ridge I met
with protracted resistance, a lack of supplies might compel me to
abandon the attempt at a most inopportune time.

I therefore advised that the Valley campaign be terminated north of
Staunton, and I be permitted to return, carrying out on the way my
original instructions for desolating the Shenandoah country so as to
make it untenable for permanent occupation by the Confederates. I
proposed to detach the bulk of my army when this work of destruction
was completed, and send it by way of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad
through Washington to the Petersburg line, believing that I could
move it more rapidly by that route than by any other. I was
confident that if a movement of this character could be made with
celerity it would culminate in the capture of Richmond and possibly
of General Lee's army, and I was in hopes that General Grant would
take the same view of the matter; but just at this time he was so
pressed by the Government and by public-opinion at the North, that he
advocated the wholly different conception of driving Early into
eastern Virginia, and adhered to this plan with some tenacity.
Considerable correspondence regarding the subject took place between
us, throughout which I stoutly maintained that we should not risk, by
what I held to be a false move, all