flicted a good deal upon the
enemy. He took a number of prisoners. The railroad was destroyed--track
torn up and bridges burned--for a good many miles. General Heath
continued to fall back toward Georgetown. After Hutchinson had been in
command upon the Covington front six or seven days, I sent him Company
A, and the next day followed myself with Company I. Colonel Morgan was
ordered to go to Eastern Kentucky and intercept the Federal General Geo.
W. Morgan on his march from Cumberland Gap to the Ohio river. General
Morgan had evacuated the gap and gained two days march on the force
watching it on the other side. It was General Smith's desire that
Colonel Morgan should blockade the roads in his front, and use every
exertion to retard his progress. By uniting with General Marshall's
forces, it was hoped that Colonel Morgan, in the rugged, almost
impassable country, through which the Federal column had to march, might
stop it altogether, until another body of troops could be thrown upon
its rear, and thus literally starve it into surrender. As it was,
Marshall remained inactive, and Morgan after felling trees across the
road, climbing up and down mountains, and sticking close to the front of
the column for six days, was compelled to suffer the mortification of
seeing it get away triumphantly.

While Colonel Morgan was employed in the mountains, General Smith
directed me to annoy the enemy as much as possible in the direction of
Covington. On the evening that I arrived at Walton, where Hutchinson had
been encamped, I found him in retreat, pressed by a superior force of
the enemy. We soon found that we could not efficiently check the enemy's
advance, and accordingly fell back to Crittenden, a little place seven
miles from Walton. The enemy encamped five miles from the place. On the
next morning we were driven out of Crittenden, and as the enemy
continued to advance, I dispatched General Heath that I believed it was
an advance upon Lexington. The enemy's force consisted, as we afterward
ascertained, of about seven thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry, or,
perhaps a little more, and eight pieces of artillery. Skirmishers were
thrown out, in strong lines, for a mile or more on each side of the
road. The country was open and easily traversed by troops, enabling them
to strengthen any part of the line that might need it. We could
therefore hope to effect little; and after carefully reconnoitering,
without finding a convenient