eneral Bragg must
certainly, when he issued it, have supposed that General Buell's whole
army was coming from that direction. How strange is it that a commander
who could thus resolve to fight his foes, when he believed them to be
united, should fear to encounter them separately. Whatever may be the
verdict upon General Polk's disobedience of orders, whether it was one
of those cases in which a subordinate can rightfully exercise this
discretion or not, the fact of General Bragg's incompetency looms up in
unmistakable proportions.

The most remarkable feature of General Bragg's conduct was this strange,
unexampled vacillation. There was perhaps never afforded such an
instance of perfect infirmity and fickleness of purpose. He had, there
can be little doubt, resolved to retreat without delivering battle
before the 1st of October. He nevertheless sought to fight at Frankfort
(as has been seen) a few days afterward. Again, immediately afterward,
he did his best to avoid battle when it could have been delivered (as
all but himself thought) under far more favorable circumstances. No one
now doubts, I presume, that General Bragg fought at Perryville with a
fragment of his army, not to win a victory, but to check the enemy and
cover his retreat.

After General Polk moved to Perryville, General Bragg, of course,
learned of the advance of the enemy in that direction, and must have
known that it was in strong column, or he would not have permitted
sixteen thousand troops to collect there to oppose it. He was still in
error regarding the other movements, and left the larger part of his
army to confront the forces maneuvering about Lawrenceburg and
Frankfort. One glance at the map will show the reader that, if the enemy
was really advancing in heavy columns by these different routes, it was
clearly General Bragg's best policy to have struck and crushed (if he
could) that body threatening him from the south. If he crushed that his
line of retreat would be safe, and he could have fought the other at his
leisure, or not at all, as he chose. He could have fought (if it had
continued to advance) at Bryantsville, or gone after and attacked it.
If, on the contrary, he had concentrated to fight at Frankfort or
Lawrenceburg, defeat, with this other force on his line of retreat,
would have been ruinous. Even complete and decisive victory would have
left him still in danger, having still another army to defeat or drive
away. He would have b