is common war with the Crowns of France and Spain.
Nevertheless, the necessity of these measures appears clearly, since,
according to our judgments, nothing was more natural, nor more
conformable to sound policy, founded upon the laws of the nature the
most precise, than that this Republic, immediately after the formal
declaration of war by the English (not being yet able to do any thing by
military exploits, not being in a state of defence sufficiently
respectable to dare, at sea, to oppose one fleet or squadron, to our
perfidious enemy) should have commenced by acknowledging, by a public
declaration, the Independence of North America. This would have been
from that time the greatest step to the humiliation of England, and our
own re-establishment; and by this measure, the Republic would have
proved her firm resolution to act with vigour. Every one of our
inhabitants, all Europe, who have their eyes fixed upon us, the whole
World expected, with just reason, this measure from the Republic. It is
true, that before the formal declaration of war by England, one might
perhaps have alleged some plausible reason, to justify, in some degree,
the backwardness in this great and interesting affair. But, as at
present Great Britain is no longer our secret, but declared enemy, which
dissolves all the connections between the two nations; and as it is the
duty, not only of all the Regencies, but also of all the Citizens of
this Republic, to reduce, by all imaginable annoyances, this enemy so
unjust to reason, and to force him, if possible, to conclude an
honourable peace; why should we hesitate any longer, to strike, by this
measure so reasonable, the most sensible blow to the common enemy? Will
not this delay occasion a suspicion that we prefer the interest of our
enemy to that of our country? North America, so sensibly offended by the
refusal of her offer; France and Spain, in the midst of a war supported
with activity, must they not regard us as the secret friends, and
favourers of their and our common enemy? Have they not reason to
conclude from it, that our inaction ought to be less attributed to our
weakness, than to our affection for England? Will not this opinion
destroy all confidence in our nation heretofore so renowned in this
respect? And our allies, at this time natural, must they not imagine,
that it is better to have in us declared enemies than pretended friends?
And shall we not be involved in a ruinous war, which we mi