agreeable to
the King than to the Cardinal, Henry gave her secret assurances that he
would not lend his aid toward oppressing France in its present helpless
state, and obliged her to promise that she would not consent to
dismember the kingdom even in order to procure her son's liberty.

During these transactions, Charles, whose pretensions to moderation and
disinterestedness were soon forgotten, deliberated, with the utmost
solicitude, how he might derive the greatest advantages from the
misfortunes of his adversary. Some of his counsellors advised him to
treat Francis with the magnanimity that became a victorious prince, and,
instead of taking advantage of his situation to impose rigorous
conditions, to dismiss him on such equal terms as would bind him forever
to his interest by the ties of gratitude and affection, more forcible as
well as more permanent than any which could be formed by extorted oaths
and involuntary stipulations.

Such an exertion of generosity is not, perhaps, to be expected in the
conduct of political affairs, and it was far too refined for that prince
to whom it was proposed. The more obvious but less splendid scheme, of
endeavoring to make the utmost of Francis' calamity, had a greater
number in the council to recommend it, and suited better with the
Emperor's genius. But though Charles adopted this plan, he seems not to
have executed it in the most proper manner. Instead of making one great
effort to penetrate into France with all the forces of Spain and the Low
Countries; instead of crushing the Italian states before they recovered
from the consternation which the success of his arms had occasioned, he
had recourse to the artifices of intrigue and negotiation. This
proceeded partly from necessity, partly from the natural disposition of
his mind. The situation of his finances at that time rendered it
extremely difficult to carry on any extraordinary armament; and he
himself, having never appeared at the head of his armies, the command of
which he had hitherto committed to his generals, was averse to bold and
martial counsels, and trusted more to the arts with which he was
acquainted. He laid, besides, too much stress upon the victory of
Pavia, as if by that event the strength of France had been annihilated,
its resources exhausted, and the kingdom itself, no less than the person
of its monarch, had been subjected to his power.

Full of this opinion, he determined to set the highest price upon