es within the Canal even if there were no strict necessity for
doing so; could embark and disembark troops, munitions of war, or
warlike materials in the Canal, although all these were destined to be
made use of during the war generally, and not only for the defence of
the Canal against a possible attack. There ought, however, to be no
doubt that the United States is as much bound to obey the rules of
Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty as Great Britain or any other
foreign State. These rules are intended to invest the Canal with the
character of neutrality. If the United States were not bound to obey
them, the Canal would lose its neutral character, and, in case she were
a belligerent, her opponent would be justified in considering the Canal
a part of the region of war and could, therefore, make it the theatre
of war. The mere fact that Article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty
refers to the rules in existence concerning the neutralisation of the
Suez Canal, and that Article IV of the Suez Canal Treaty of 1888
expressly stipulates the neutralisation of the Canal even should Turkey
be a belligerent, ought to be sufficient to prove that the
neutralisation of the Panama Canal is stipulated by the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty even should the United States be a belligerent.
Furthermore, one must come to the same conclusion if one takes into
consideration the objects, which are three in number, of the
neutralisation of an inter-oceanic canal.
The first object is that a canal shall be open in time of war as well
as in time of peace, so that navigation through the canal may be
unhampered by the fact that war is being waged. If the canal were not
neutralised, the territorial sovereign would be compelled, if he were
neutral in a war, to prevent the passing through the canal of
men-of-war of either belligerent, because such passage would be
equivalent to the passage of belligerent troops through neutral land
territory.
The second object is that the territorial sovereign shall be prevented
from closing a canal or interfering with the free use of it by vessels
of all nations in case he himself is a party to a war. If the canal
were not neutralised, the belligerent territorial sovereign could,
during the war, close the canal or interfere with its free use by
neutral vessels.
The third object is that a canal shall not be damaged, nor navigation
thereon be prevented or hampered by the opponent in case the
territorial sovereign i
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