thought is
correct[2] since International and Municipal Law differ as regards
their sources, the relations they regulate, and the substance of their
law. Rules of International Law can, therefore, only be applied by
Municipal Courts in their administration of the law in case and in so
far as such rules have been adopted into Municipal Law either by a
special Act of the legislature, or by custom, or implicitly.

[2] See my treatise on International Law, 2nd edition (1912),
Vol. I, Sec.Sec.20-25.

Now the practice of the Courts[3] of the United States neither agrees
with the doctrine of the former nor with the doctrine of the latter
school of publicists, but takes a middle line between them. Indeed it
considers International Law to be part and parcel of the Municipal Law
of the United States. It is, however, far from accepting the maxim that
International Law overrules Municipal Law, it accepts rather two
maxims, namely, first, that _International Law overrules previous
Municipal Law_, and, secondly, that _Municipal Law overrules previous
International Law_. In the administration of the law American Courts
hold themselves bound to apply the Acts of their legislature even in
the case in which the rules of these enactments are not in conformity
with rules of previous International Law. It is true that, according to
Article VI of the American Constitution, all international treaties of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land, but in case an
Act of Congress contains rules not in agreement with stipulations of a
previous international treaty, the American Courts consider themselves
bound by the Act of Congress, and not by the stipulations of the
previous treaty. It is obvious that, according to the practice of the
Courts of the United States, International Law and Municipal Law are of
_equal_ force, so that on the one hand new rules of International
Law supersede rules of previous Municipal Law, and, on the other hand,
new rules of Municipal Law supersede rules of previous International
Law. For this reason, the American Courts cannot be resorted to in
order to have the question decided whether or no the enactments of
Section 5 of the Panama Canal Act are in conformity with Article III,
No. 1, of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

[3] See the account of the practice of the American Court in
Scott's learned article in the _American Journal of International
Law_, Vol. I (1908), pp. 856-8