themselves, in the division
of the spoils secured from others, but that does not make them upright
men, nor does it make their business honest. If it were possible to
preserve equity between the borrower and the lender upon usury, yet
that would not justify the act nor remove the evil. The collection of
their profits, which they divide equitably among themselves, imposes a
burden upon others who have no part in the transaction. Their
satisfactory agreement does not make the transaction less detrimental
to the general good. It may the rather partake of the nature of a
conspiracy against the public welfare.

The promoter of an enterprise on borrowed capital is practically but
the agent of the lender. He may be the director and manager but he so
conducts his undertaking as to gather the usury from others. When the
opportunities for profitable investments become rare, and money
accumulates and is lying idle, such promoters with their schemes are
encouraged in order to gain a profit on the investment, though others
suffer by it.

There lies upon this table a booklet, written in 1841, which charges
and proves complicity between the bankers and brokers of New York at
that time. The bankers loaned the brokers the money which they
reloaned at very high rates. The banks refused accommodations to those
in pressing need, compelling them to go to the brokers and to submit
to their extortionate demands.

Though there may be an equitable arrangement between the owner of
property and his broker and between the broker and his promoter, yet
in the last analysis it will be found that this equitable arrangement,
in its ultimate result, is of the nature of a conspiracy to compel the
innocent poor to pay the profits of both; their consent is not first
secured nor do they gain a single advantage and they are helpless to
resist.

Though the transaction may have been between the rich, a rich lender
and a rich borrower, yet the final result is that the interest is paid
by the poor. In Calvin's letter of apology he supposes a case of
equity between a rich land owner who is in need of ready money and the
man who has money to buy a farm, but instead lends to his rich
landlord and takes a mortgage. In this case the tenants of the
borrower must pay the interest and finally the principal also. This
increases the hardness of their hard lot. Though Calvin seems to
appreciate the severe conditions of the ordinary tenant in his day,
yet he fails to