o the peace of their country? Is
it to be doubted, that, if they have not strength enough at home, they
will call in foreign force to aid them?

Would you deny them _what is reasonable_, for fear they should?
Certainly not. It would be barbarous to pretend to look into the minds
of men. I would go further: it would not be just even to trace
consequences from principles which, though evident to me, were denied by
them. Let them disband as a faction, and let them act as individuals,
and when I see them with no other views than to enjoy their own
conscience in peace, I, for one, shall most cheerfully vote for their
relief.

A tender conscience, of all things, ought to be tenderly handled; for if
you do not, you injure not only the conscience, but the whole moral
frame and constitution is injured, recurring at times to remorse, and
seeking refuge only in making the conscience callous. But the conscience
of faction,--the conscience of sedition,--the conscience of conspiracy,
war, and confusion....

Whether anything be proper to be denied, which is right in itself,
because it may lead to the demand of others which it is improper to
grant? Abstractedly speaking, there can be no doubt that this question
ought to be decided in the negative. But as no moral questions are ever
abstract questions, this, before I judge upon any abstract proposition,
must be embodied in circumstances; for, since things are right or wrong,
morally speaking, only by their relation and connection with other
things, this very question of what it is politically right to grant
depends upon this relation to its effects. It is the direct office of
wisdom to look to the consequences of the acts we do: if it be not this,
it is worth nothing, it is out of place and of function, and a downright
fool is as capable of government as Charles Fox. A man desires a sword:
why should he be refused? A sword is a means of defence, and defence is
the natural right of man,--nay, the first of all his rights, and which
comprehends them all. But if I know that the sword desired is to be
employed to cut my own throat, common sense, and my own self-defence,
dictate to me to keep out of his hands this natural right of the sword.
But whether this denial be wise or foolish, just or unjust, prudent or
cowardly, depends entirely on the state of the man's means. A man may
have very ill dispositions, and yet be so very weak as to make all
precaution foolish. See whether this be the