displeasure in return for the sympathy manifested for the Prince at
Pesth and Vienna; and but for the strength which the friendship of
Germany afforded, that Power would almost certainly have encountered war
from the irate potentate of the North.

Turkey, having no champion, was in still greater danger; her conduct in
condoning the irregularities of Prince Alexander was as odious to
Alexander III. as the atrocities of her Bashi-bazouks ten years before
had been to his more chivalrous sire. It is an open secret that during
the summer of 1886 the Czar was preparing to deal a heavy blow. The
Sultan evaded it by adroitly shifting his ground and posing as a
well-wisher of the Czar, whereupon M. Nelidoff, the Russian ambassador
at Constantinople, proposed an offensive and defensive alliance, and
went to the length of suggesting that they should wage war against
Austria and England in order to restore the Sultan's authority over
Bosnia and Egypt at the expense of those intrusive Powers. How far
negotiations went on this matter and why they failed is not known. The
ordinary explanation, that the Czar forbore to draw the sword because of
his love of peace, hardly tallies with what is now known of his
character and his diplomacy. It is more likely that he was appeased by
the events now to be described, and thereafter attached less importance
to a direct intervention in Balkan affairs.

No greater surprise has happened in this generation than the kidnapping
of Prince Alexander by officers of the army which he had lately led to
victory. Yet the affair admits of explanation. Certain of their number
nourished resentment against him for his imperfect recognition of their
services during the Servian War, and for the introduction of German
military instructors at its close. Among the malcontents was Bendereff,
the hero of Slivnitza, who, having been guilty of discourtesy to the
Prince, was left unrewarded. On this discontented knot of men Russian
intriguers fastened themselves profitably, with the result that one
regiment at least began to waver in its allegiance.

A military plot was held in reserve as a last resort. In the first
place, a Russian subject, Captain Nabokoff, sought to simplify the
situation by hiring some Montenegrin desperadoes, and by seeking to
murder or carry off the Prince as he drew near to Bourgas during a tour
in Eastern Bulgaria. This plan came to light through the fidelity of a
Bulgarian peasant, whereupon Na