, 'that he would lose his life to _serve_
his country, but would not do a base thing to _save_ it.'

He farther remarks on the tendency of Bentham and his followers to
treat Ethics too _juridically_. He would probably admit that Ethics is
strictly speaking a code of laws, but draws the line between it and the
juridical code, by the distinction of dispositions and actions. We may
have to approve the author of an injurious action, because it is
well-meant; the law must nevertheless punish it. Herein Ethics has its
alliance with Religion, which looks at the disposition or the heart.

He is disappointed at finding that Dugald Stewart, who made
applications of the law of association and appreciated its powers, held
back from, and discountenanced, the attempt of Hartley to resolve the
Moral Sense, styling it 'an ingenious refinement on the Selfish
system,' and representing those opposed to himself in Ethics as
deriving the affections from 'self-love.' He repeats that the
derivation theory affirms the disinterestedness of human actions as
strongly as Butler himself; while it gets over the objection from the
multiplication of original principles; and ascribes the result to the
operation of a real agent.

In replying to Brown's refusal to accept the derivation of Conscience,
on the ground that the process belongs to a time beyond remembrance, he
affirms it to be a sufficient theory, if the supposed action
_resembles_ what we know to be the operation of the principle where we
have direct experience of it.

His concluding Section, VII., entitled General Remarks, gives some
farther explanations of his characteristic views. He takes up the
principle of Utility, at the point where Brown bogled at it; quoting
Brown's concession, that Utility and virtue are so related, that there
is _perhaps_ no action generally felt to be virtuous that is not
beneficial, and that every case of benefit willingly done excites
approbation. He strikes out Brown's word 'perhaps,' as making the
affirmation either conjectural or useless; and contends that the two
facts,--morality and the general benefit,--being co-extensive, should
be reciprocally tests of each other. He qualifies, as usual, by not
allowing utility to be, on all occasions, the immediate incentive of
actions. He holds, however, that the main doctrine is an essential
corollary from the Divine Benevolence.

He then replies specifically to the question, 'Why is utility not to be
the sole e