wn good with the
good of others--prudence with virtue. Virtue is 'an inward fountain of
pure delight;' the pleasure of benevolence, 'if it could become lasting
and intense, would convert the heart into a heaven;' they alone are
happy, or truly virtuous, that do not need the motive of a regard to
outward consequences.
His chief Ethical precursor in this vein is Shaftesbury; but he is
easily able to produce from Theologians abundant iterations of it.
IV.--He has no special views as to the Moral Code. With reference to
the inducements to virtue, he thinks he has a powerful lever in the
delights that the virtuous disposition confers on its owner.
V.--His theory of the connexion of Ethics and Politics is stated in his
account of Bentham, whom he charges with making morality too judicial.
VI.--The relations of Morality to Religion are a matter of frequent and
special consideration in Mackintosh.
JAMES MILL. [1783-1836.]
The work of James Mill, entitled the 'Analysis of the Human Mind,' is
distinguished, in the first glace, by the studied precision of its
definitions of all leading terms, giving it a permanent value as a
logical discipline; and in the second place, by the successful carrying
out of the principle of Association in explaining the powers of the
mind. The author endeavours to show that the moral feelings are a
complex product or growth, of which the ultimate constituents are our
pleasurable and painful sensations. We shall present a brief abstract
of the course of his exposition, as given in Chapters XVII.--XXIII. of
the Analysis.
The pleasurable and painful sensations being assumed, it is important
to take notice of their Causes, both immediate and remote, by whose
means they can be secured or avoided. We contract a habit of passing
rapidly from every sensation to its procuring cause; and, as in the
typical case of money, these causes are apt to rank higher in
importance, to take a greater hold on the mind, than the sensations
themselves. The mind is not much interested in attending to the
sensation; that can provide for itself. The mind is deeply interested
in attending to the cause.
The author next (XIX.) considers the Ideas of the pleasurable
sensations, and of the causes of them. The Idea of a pain is not the
same as the pain; it is a complex state, containing, no doubt, an
element of pain; and the name for it is Aversion. So the name for an
idea of pleasure is Desire. Now, these states exte
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