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e have already said that Prudence or Judiciousness is good counsel on human interests, with a view to action. But we must also add that it comprises a knowledge not of universals merely, but also of particulars; and experienced men, much conversant with particulars, are often better qualified for action than inexperienced men of science (VII.). Prudence is the same in its intellectual basis as the political science or art--yet looked at in a different aspect. Both of them are practical and consultative, respecting matters of human good and evil; but prudence, in the stricter sense of the word, concerns more especially the individual self; still, the welfare of the individual is perhaps inseparable from household and state concerns. Prudence farther implies a large experience; whence boys, who can become good mathematicians, cannot have practical judgment or prudence. In consultation, we are liable to error both in regard to universals, and in regard to particulars; it is the business of prudence, as well as of the political science, to guard against both. That prudence is not identical with Science, is plain enough; for Science is the intermediate process between the first principles and the last conclusions; whereas prudence consists chiefly in seizing these last, which are the applications of reasoning, and represent the particular acts to be done. Prudence is the counterpart of Reason [Greek: Nous] or Intellect, but at the opposite extremity of the mental process. For Intellect [Greek: Nous] apprehends the extreme Universals,--the first principles,--themselves not deducible, but from which deduction starts; while Prudence fastens on the extreme particulars, which are not known by Science, but by sensible Perception. We mean here by sensible Perception, not what is peculiar to any of the five senses, but what is common to them all--whereby we perceive that the triangle before us is a geometrical ultimatum, and that it is the final subject of application for all the properties previously demonstrated to belong to triangles generally. The mind will stop here in the downward march towards practical application, as it stopped at first principles in the upward march. Prudence becomes, however, confounded with sensible perception, when we reach this stage. [The statement here given involves Aristotle's distinction of the proper and the common Sensibles; a shadowing out of the muscular element in sensation] (VIII.). Good c
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