s down the difficult river to its mouth and, after delay
by winds, put to sea on the 28th of June. By a stroke of good fortune
he sailed the two hundred miles to New York in two days and missed the
great fleet of d'Estaing, carrying an army of four thousand men. On the
8th of July d'Estaing anchored at the mouth of the Delaware. Had not his
passage been unusually delayed and Howe's unusually quick, as Washington
noted, the British fleet and the transports in the Delaware would
probably have been taken and Clinton and his army would have shared the
fate of Burgoyne.

As it was, though Howe's fleet was clear away, Clinton's army had a bad
time in the march across New Jersey. Its baggage train was no less than
twelve miles long and, winding along roads leading sometimes through
forests, was peculiarly vulnerable to flank attack. In this type of
warfare Washington excelled. He had fought over this country and he knew
it well. The tragedy of Valley Forge was past. His army was now well
trained and well supplied. He had about the same number of men as the
British--perhaps sixteen thousand--and he was not encumbered by a long
baggage train. Thus it happened that Washington was across the Delaware
almost as soon as the British. He marched parallel with them on a line
some five miles to the north and was able to forge towards the head of
their column. He could attack their flank almost when he liked. Clinton
marched with great difficulty. He found bridges down. Not only was
Washington behind him and on his flank but General Gates was in front
marching from the north to attack him when he should try to cross the
Raritan River. The long British column turned southeastward toward Sandy
Hook, so as to lessen the menace from Gates. Between the half of the
army in the van and the other half in the rear was the baggage train.

The crisis came on Sunday the 28th of June, a day of sweltering heat. By
this time General Charles Lee, Washington's second in command, was in
a good position to attack the British rear guard from the north, while
Washington, marching three miles behind Lee, was to come up in the hope
of overwhelming it from the rear. Clinton's position was difficult but
he was saved by Lee's ineptitude. He had positive instructions to attack
with his five thousand men and hold the British engaged until Washington
should come up in overwhelming force. The young La Fayette was with Lee.
He knew what Washington had ordered, but Lee