aid. Howe seemed free to make his own plans and he longed to
be master of the enemy's capital. In the end he decided to take
Philadelphia--a task easy enough, as the event proved. At Howe's elbow
was the traitorous American general, Charles Lee, whom he had recently
captured, and Lee, as we know, told him that Maryland and Pennsylvania
were at heart loyal to the King and panting to be free from the tyranny
of the demagogue. Once firmly in the capital Howe believed that he would
have secure control of Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. He could
achieve this and be back at New York in time to meet Burgoyne, perhaps
at Albany. Then he would hold the colony of New York from Staten Island
to the Canadian frontier. Howe found that he could send ships up the
Hudson, and the American army had to stand on the banks almost helpless
against the mobility of sea power. Washington's left wing rested on
the Hudson and he held both banks but neither at Peekskill nor, as yet,
farther up at West Point, could his forts prevent the passage of ships.
It was a different matter for the British to advance on land. But the
ships went up and down in the spring of 1777. It would be easy enough to
help Burgoyne when the time should come.
It was summer before Howe was ready to move, and by that time he had
received instructions that his first aim must be to cooperate with
Burgoyne. First, however, he was resolved to have Philadelphia.
Washington watched Howe in perplexity. A great fleet and a great army
lay at New York. Why did they not move? Washington knew perfectly well
what he himself would have done in Howe's place. He would have attacked
rapidly in April the weak American army and, after destroying or
dispersing it, would have turned to meet Burgoyne coming southward from
Canada. Howe did send a strong force into New Jersey. But he did not
know how weak Washington really was, for that master of craft in war
disseminated with great skill false information as to his own supposed
overwhelming strength. Howe had been bitten once by advancing too far
into New Jersey and was not going to take risks. He tried to entice
Washington from the hills to attack in open country. He marched here and
there in New Jersey and kept Washington alarmed and exhausted by counter
marches, and always puzzled as to what the next move should be. Howe
purposely let one of his secret messengers be taken bearing a despatch
saying that the fleet was about to sail for B
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