of
their batteries; their stanch and obstinate courage, which often went
down only before the intolerable contact of the bayonet, had been made
undeniably manifest. What had they availed against our imperturbable
intrepidity, under circumstances and at a moment in which we might have
thrown, almost without dishonour, the blame of discomfiture upon
physical infirmities, that overmaster the brave and the strong as
relentlessly as the timid and feeble? What would they avail, when the
chances were fairer for us--the collision more even? When the fight at
Moodkee was done, there was not, of the surviving victors, a Queen's
soldier or a sepoy who had not already settled to his own satisfaction
the whole campaign of the Sutlej, in the pithy but comprehensive
conviction, that he should drub the Sikhs whenever he met them. The
logician smiles at the vulnerable reasoning; the soldier smiles, too,
and feels himself clad in better armour than steel or brass. There had
been a reciprocal amicable emulation every where prevalent throughout
the battle, between the officers and the men, between our Indian and our
European troops. The Governor-General shared all the perils of the
field; Sale and M'Caskill "foremost fighting fell;" while our native
regiments vied with, and were not excelled by, their British comrades in
active daring or unswerving steadiness. One temper, one will, and a
universal mutual confidence, thrilled through, cemented, and fired the
whole mass.

On the day after the battle, the Sikhs having retired upon their
intrenchments at Ferozeshah, orders were sent to direct Sir John
Littler, with the Ferozepore force, to join as soon as possible the main
army. The relief of Ferozepore--threatened, according to the first
reports received by the Governor-General, by the Sikh army _en
masse_--had been his primary object in those rapid marches which brought
him to Moodkee. It now appears that, on the 13th of December, Sir John
Littler had moved out of Ferozepore into camp, and on the 15th took up a
strong position at a village about two miles to the southeast of his
encampment, in order to intercept the anticipated attack on the city.
The Sikh camp was distinctly visible, and supposed to contain 60,000
men, with 120 guns. Three days passed without even a demonstration of
active hostility; and on the night of the 17th, the Sikhs were moving
away to meet the Governor-General. On the evening of the 20th,
therefore, Sir John Littl