to facilitate a
connexion with this power, which will be their neighbor.

That it would become the wisdom of Congress to discover moderation
with respect to them. That he is persuaded England will see with
pleasure, divisions introduced between the United States and the Court
of Madrid, and that it is probable, that they will even endeavor to
animate them one against the other. That British emissaries have been
employed to inspire Spain with apprehensions as to the ambitious views
of America. But they will now avail themselves of this intimacy with
the American Ministers, to render them suspicious of Spain, and even
to excite their resentments against her. Congress will defeat this
design by removing the difficulties, which now oppose themselves to a
union with his Catholic Majesty. That the King wishes so much to see
his allies enjoy a solid and durable peace, that in exciting the
Americans on one side to discover a more conciliatory spirit, he will
spare nothing on the other to remove the difficulties, which may be
raised by the Court of Spain. That he apprehends delays and
embarrassments from Holland. That the British Administration appear
very unfavorable to them.

The Minister of France then read to Mr Livingston another letter from
the Count de Vergennes, of the 20th of December, 1782, which contained
in substance; that peace was not yet concluded; that it was anxiously
desired by the King. That his Majesty's obligations to his allies had
not yet permitted him to pronounce with certainty as to the
termination of the war. That expecting peace, prudence required, that
the allies should act as if the war was to continue. That Congress
will judge of the manner in which they can most effectually contribute
to distress the common enemy. That in the present state of things it
would not be prudent to invite the Americans to form any direct
enterprise against the common enemy. That the Provisional Articles
would, when executed, at the general peace, put New York into the
hands of the Americans, and that Congress could judge better than they
could what part it would be expedient for them to take in the then
state of things. That proposing nothing they leave everything to their
discretion. That the Minister should however inform them, that he
could not yet determine whether they were at the eve of the war or if
another campaign must be opened. That in the latter case there were
two essential objects, on which the Minister