s study of
naval strategy, I reconstructed independently Howe's three engagements
of May 28th and 29th, and June 1st, from the details given by James,
Troude, and Chevalier, analyzing and discussing the successive
tactical measures of the opposing admirals; in the battle of June 1st
going so far as to trace even the tracks of the fifty-odd individual
ships throughout the action. This, the most complicated presentation I
ever attempted, was a needless elaboration, though of absorbing
interest to me when once begun. A comparison between it and the bare
conventional diagram of Trafalgar in the same volumes, which has been
criticised as not reproducing the facts, may serve to show how far
multiplicity of minutiae conduces to clearness of perception. From the
Trafalgar plan a reader, lay or professional, can grasp readily the
underlying conceptions upon which the battle was fought, and the
manner in which they were executed, as commonly received; but who ever
has tried to comprehend the movements of the vessels on June 1st, as I
elicited them? Assuming their correctness, it was a mere mental
diversion, in result rather confusing than illuminative to a student;
whereas ships arranged like beads on a string can give an impression
fundamentally correct, and to be apprehended at a glance. So far from
tending to lucidity, accumulation of detail in pursuit of minute
accuracy rather obscures. Nelson himself indicated his intentions
sufficiently by straight lines. One merit my June 1st plan may
possibly possess; the perplexing optical effect may convey better than
words the intricacy of a naval _melee_.

Coincidently with the study of military events, connoted by Howe's
campaign and Jomini, I of course did a good deal of reading which here
can be described only as miscellaneous; prominent amid which was
Thiers's _History of the Consulate and Empire_, Napoleon's
_Correspondence and Commentaries_, and the orations of Pitt and Fox.
From Thiers, confirmed by contemporary memoirs and pamphlets and other
incidental mention, I gained my conviction that the Continental System
was the determinative factor in Napoleon's fortunes after Tilsit.
Pitt's speeches, taken with his life, seemed to me conclusive as to
his policy, despite the evil construction placed upon his acts by
Frenchmen of his day, which Thiers has perpetuated. I saw clearly and
conclusively, as I thought, apparent in his public words and private
letters, a strong desire for pe