I
gave up looking for General Grobler, and on the following morning
rejoined my men at Klipriversberg.

It was by no means easy to find out the exact position of affairs.
Our scouts reported that the enemy's left wing, having broken through
General Grobler's position, were now marching along Van Wijk's Rust. I
could, however, obtain no definite information regarding the right
wing, nor could I discover the General under whose orders I was to
place myself. General Lemmer, moreover, was suffering from an acute
disease of the kidneys, which had compelled him to hand over his
command to Commandant Gravett, who had proved himself an excellent
officer.

General Grobler had lost the majority of his men, or what was more
likely the case, they had lost him. He declared that he was unaware of
General Botha's or Mr. Kruger's plans, and that it was absurd to keep
running away, but he clearly did not feel equal to any more fighting,
although he had not the moral courage to openly say so. From this
point this gentleman did no further service to his country, and was
shortly afterwards dismissed. The reader will now gather an idea of
the enormous change which had come over our troops. Six months before
they had been cheerful and gay, confident of the ultimate success of
their cause; now they were downhearted and in the lowest of spirits. I
must admit that in this our officers were no exception.

Those were dark days for us. Now began the real fighting, and this
under the most difficult and distressing circumstances; and I think
that if our leaders could have had a glimpse of the difficulties and
hardships that were before us, they would not have had the courage to
proceed any further in the struggle.

Early next morning (the 29th May, 1900) we reached Klipspruit, and
found there several other commandos placed in extended order all the
way up to Doornkop.

Amongst them was that of General De la Rey, who had come from the
Western frontier of our Republic, and that of General Snyman, whom I
regard as the real defender and reliever of Mafeking, for he was
afraid to attack a garrison of 1,000 men with twice that number of
burghers.

Before having had time to properly fortify our position we were
attacked on the right flank by General French's cavalry, while the
left flank had to resist a strong opposing force of cavalry. Both
attacks were successfully repulsed, as well as a third in the centre
of our fighting line.

The British n