aria, big or little,
was not inclined to submit to dictation in national affairs from Russia.

The position after the Treaty of Berlin in the Balkans was this: four
virtually independent small nations held old Turkish provinces, and each
desired eagerly, and claimed on historical grounds, extensions of their
territory at the expense of the Turk or at the expense of one another.
Each was tempted to try the means to its end of intrigue with one of the
great Powers. These Powers, still keeping in view their own ambitions,
looked upon and treated the Balkan States as instruments to be used or
to be discarded without reference to the happiness of the Balkans and
with sole reference to the "European situation." Put a group of hungry
and badly trained boys in a cake-shop; set over them as a Board of
Appeal unjust, selfish, and intriguing masters; and you may not expect
peace. That has been for nearly a century the position in the Balkans.

The Balkan League between Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro,
formed about 1912, offered the first steady hope of a peaceful
settlement in the peninsula. There was the beginning there of a movement
which might have developed on the lines of the Swiss Federation and
grown to a Balkan Power in which the Slav element and the Graeco-Roman
element could have combined, in spite of differences of language and of
religion. The fact that Roumania stood out of the League was the first
unfavourable circumstance. True, Roumania is not a Balkan State in the
strict sense of the word, but her national destiny is clearly to be
either a partner with the Balkan States or the humble friend of one of
the great Powers on her borders. This fact is recognised now, and for
the time being Roumania is actually the head of a loose Balkan
combination formed in 1913.

More dangerous to the future of the Balkan League than the abstention
of Roumania was the fact that it had to face the strong hostility of
Austria, and therefore of the Triple Alliance; and it had hardly the
warm sympathy of Russia and was not therefore strongly favoured by the
Triple Entente. Great Britain, whose interests were all to be served and
not hindered by the growth of a Balkan Power, was the only strong friend
the Balkan League had; and her friendship was not strong enough to make
her support a matter of definite national policy.

If Europe had had an unselfish interest in the Balkans it would have
welcomed the Balkan League and made ev