le in
their rear.

[Illustration: AN ADRIANOPLE STREET
Over the roofs, the spiral minaret of Bourmali Jami, white marble
and red granite]

It was not merely that Adrianople was a fortress, but it was a fortress
which straddled their one line of communication. The railway from
Sofia to Constantinople passed through Adrianople. Except for that
railway there was no other railroad, and there was no other carriage
road, one might say, for the Turk did not build roads. Once you were
across the Turkish frontier you met with tracks, not roads.

The effect of leaving Adrianople in the hands of the enemy was that
supplies for the army in the field coming from Bulgaria could travel by
one of two routes. They could come through Yamboli to Kirk Kilisse, or
they could come through Novi Zagora to Mustapha Pasha by railway, and
then to Kirk Kilisse around Adrianople. From Kirk Kilisse to the
rail-head at Seleniki, close to Chatalja, they could come not by railway
but by a tramway, a very limited railway. If Adrianople had fallen, the
railway would have been open. The Bulgarian railway service had, I
think, something over one hundred powerful locomotives at the outset of
the war, and whilst it was a single line in places, it was an effective
line right down to as near Constantinople as they could get. But,
Adrianople being in the hands of the enemy, supplies coming from Yamboli
had to travel to Kirk Kilisse by track, mostly by bullock wagon, and
that journey took five, six, or seven days. The British Army Medical
Detachment travelling over that road took six days.

If one took the other road one got to Mustapha Pasha comfortably by
railway. And then it was necessary to use bullock or horse transport
from Mustapha Pasha to Kirk Kilisse. That journey I took twice; once
with an ox-wagon, and afterwards with a set of fast horses, and the
least period for the journey was five days. From Kirk Kilisse there was
a line of light railway joining the main line. But on that line the
Bulgarians had only six engines, and, I think, thirty-two carriages; so
that, for practical purposes, the railway was of very little use indeed
past Mustapha Pasha. Whilst Adrianople was in the hands of the enemy,
the Bulgarians had practically no line of communication.

My reason for believing that it was not the original plan of the
generals to leave Adrianople "masked" is, that in the first instance I
have a fairly high opinion of the generals, and I do not thi