lthough there had never been the slightest personal collision. Its
bitter and invidious spirit was not in the least disguised by a few
exaggerated compliments adroitly inserted here and there: these
merely furnish the foil needed to give greater potency and efficiency
to the personal insinuations, and, like Mark Antony's compliments to
Caesar's assassins, subserved quite too many politic purposes to be
accepted as sincere. Only a native of Boeotia could be imposed upon by
them, when the actual character of the book in question was carefully
misrepresented, and when the self-evident trend, tenor, and aim of the
ostensible review were to excite public prejudice against the author
on grounds wholly irrespective of the truth or untruth of his
expressed opinions.

Of course, the very largest liberty must be and should be conceded to
legitimate criticism. From this, as is well known, I never shrank in
the least; on the contrary, I court it, and desire nothing better for
my books, provided only that the criticism be pertinent, intelligent,
and fair. But misrepresentation for the purpose of detraction is not
criticism at all; and (notwithstanding numerous quotations perverted
by unfair and misleading glosses, including two misquotations quite
too useful to be accidental) this ostensible review is, from beginning
to end, nothing but misrepresentation for the purpose of detraction.
Passing over numerous minor instances, permit me to invite your
attention to three gross instances of such misrepresentation.

II.

The book under review had taken the utmost pains (pages 16-39,
especially page 39) to distinguish "realism" from "idealism," and to
argue for the former in opposition to the latter, on the ground of the
absolute incompatibility of the latter with the scientific method of
investigation. It had taken the utmost pains to make the contrast
broad and deep, and to point out its far-reaching consequences by
explicitly opposing (1) scientific realism to philosophical idealism
in general, and in particular (2) constructive realism to constructive
idealism, (3) critical realism to critical idealism, (4) ethical
realism to ethical idealism, and (5) religious realism to religious
idealism. Any fair or honorable critic would recognize this contrast
and opposition between realism and idealism as the very foundation of
the work he was criticising, and would at least state it candidly, as
the foundation of his own favorable or unfavo