y
to self-defence against a libel, and to concede only the parliamentary
freedom proper to a purely literary discussion_. Since, however, the
only object of my writing at all was to expose his rejoinder as a
second libel, and since the central aim of the "Memorandum" was to
defeat this very object, nothing could be plainer than this: that Dr.
Royce, having been guilty of two unprovoked and malicious libels, now
sought to prevent the exposure of his guilt by suppressing the
necessary freedom of self-defence. For, I repeat, the only possible
defence against a libel is to prove that it _is_ a libel, and this
cannot be done without reflecting upon the "personal character" of the
libeller. It was no fault of mine that he had himself rendered a
"parliamentary" discussion impossible; it was no fault of mine that he
had made his own "personal character" the real point at issue; it was
no fault of mine that he now betrayed his secret alarm, uttered a cry
for "mercy," and convicted himself out of his own mouth, in his
extraordinary and indescribable "Memorandum." That "Memorandum" tells
the whole story.

On the failure of Dr. Royce's very injudicious attempt at dictation,
Dr. Adler found himself compelled to assume the editorial power and
responsibility, which he ought to have assumed and exercised in the
first instance by refusing publication to Dr. Royce's original libel.
But, yielding to Dr. Royce's influence, he took the same position, and
still tried to shield the libeller from the just and lawful
consequences of his libel. No principle is more firmly established in
the public conscience, as interpreted by the common law, than that the
fact of an attack by A involves the right of self-defence by B.
Whoever, therefore, has permitted an attack which he might have
prevented is bound to permit the self-defence, also; and Dr. Adler,
having granted to Dr. Royce the freedom of libelling me, was bound to
grant to me the equal freedom of defending myself against the libel.
But this equal freedom Dr. Adler denied. After some fruitless
correspondence, I wrote to him on May 4 as follows: "I require the
freedom, not of 'parliament,' but of the courts--freedom to present my
'facts,' and no less to draw my 'inferences'--freedom to array my
evidence, and no less to make my pleading. By publishing his new
libel, you estop yourself from denying me this freedom. If you do deny
it, I withdraw altogether and seek justice and redress elsewhere.