as yet undeveloped as an instrument for the offensive and that it was
still short of guns and shells, the Germans had struck in the inclement
weather of February at Verdun, thinking, and wrongly to my mind, that
the handicap to the vitality of their men of sleet, frost and cold,
soaking rains would be offset by the time gained. Not only had the
Germans sufficient men to carry on the Verdun offensive, but facing the
British their numbers were the largest mile for mile since the first
battle of Ypres. Familiar with British valor as the result of actual
contact in battle from Mons to the Marne and back to Ypres, and
particularly in the Loos offensive (which was the New Army's first
"eye-opener" to the German staff), the Germans reasoned that, with what
one German called "the courage of their stupidity, or the stupidity of
their courage," the British, driven by public demand to the assistance
of the French, would send their fresh infantry with inadequate artillery
support against German machine guns and curtains of fire, and pile up
their dead until their losses would reduce the whole army to inertia for
the rest of the year.

Of course, the German hypothesis--the one which cost von Falkenhayn his
place as Chief of Staff--was based on such a state of exhaustion by the
French that a British attack would be mandatory. The initial stage of
the German attack was up to expectations in ground gained, but not in
prisoners or material taken. The French fell back skilfully before the
German onslaught against positions lightly held by the defenders in
anticipation of the attack, and turned their curtains of fire upon the
enemy in possession of captured trenches. Then France gave to the
outside world another surprise. Her spirit, ever brilliant in the
offensive, became cold steel in a stubborn and thrifty defensive. She
was not "groggy," as the Germans supposed. For every yard of earth
gained they had to pay a ghastly price; and their own admiration of
French shell and valor is sufficient professional glory for either
Petain, Nivelle, or Mangin, or the private in the ranks.

_Third._ The British could take over more trench line, thus releasing
French forces for Verdun, which was the plan adopted at the conference
of the French and British commands. One morning in place of a French
army in Artois a British army was in occupation. The round helmets of
the British took the place of the oblong helmets of the French along the
parapet; Bri