ct, or Italy their ally. From the documents it would seem
that Austria kept everybody in the dark, except Prussia. It is probably
nearer the truth to say that Prussia kept everybody in the dark, including
Austria. But all that is what is called opinion, belief, conviction, or
common sense: and we are not dealing with it here. The objective fact is
that Austria told Servia to permit Servian officers to be suspended by the
authority of Austrian officers; and told Servia to submit to this within
forty-eight hours. In other words, the Sovereign of Servia was practically
told to take off not only the laurels of two great campaigns, but his own
lawful and national crown, and to do it in a time in which no respectable
citizen is expected to discharge an hotel bill. Servia asked for time for
arbitration--in short, for peace. But Russia had already begun to mobilise;
and Prussia, presuming that Servia might thus be rescued, declared war.

Between these two ends of fact, the ultimatum to Servia, the ultimatum
to Belgium, anyone so inclined can of course talk as if everything were
relative. If anyone asks why the Czar should rush to the support of
Servia, it is easy to ask why the Kaiser should rush to the support of
Austria. If anyone says that the French would attack the Germans, it
is sufficient to answer that the Germans did attack the French. There
remain, however, two attitudes to consider, even perhaps two arguments to
counter, which can best be considered and countered under this general
head of facts. First of all, there is a curious, cloudy sort of argument,
much affected by the professional rhetoricians of Prussia, who are sent
out to instruct and correct the minds of Americans or Scandinavians. It
consists of going into convulsions of incredulity and scorn at the mention
of Russia's responsibility of Servia, or England's responsibility of
Belgium; and suggesting that, treaty or no treaty, frontier or no frontier,
Russia would be out to slay Teutons or England to steal Colonies. Here, as
elsewhere, I think the professors dotted all over the Baltic plain fail in
lucidity and in the power of distinguishing ideas. Of course it is quite
true that England has material interests to defend, and will probably use
the opportunity to defend them; or, in other words, of course England, like
everybody else, would be more comfortable if Prussia were less predominant.

The fact remains that we did not do what the Germans did. We did no