ing personal knowledge of the scene and having
confidence in the effect of a joint operation, we authorized Commodore
Barron, then proceeding with his squadron, to enter into an
understanding with Hamet if he should deem it useful; and as it was
represented that he would need some aids of arms and ammunition, and
even of money, he was authorized to furnish them to a moderate extent,
according to the prospect of utility to be expected from it. In order to
avail him of the advantages of Mr. Eaton's knowledge of circumstances,
an occasional employment was provided for the latter as an agent for the
Navy in that sea. Our expectation was that an intercourse should be kept
up between the ex-Bashaw and the commodore; that while the former moved
on by land our squadron should proceed with equal pace, so as to arrive
at their destination together and to attack the common enemy by land and
sea at the same time. The instructions of June 6 to Commodore Barron
shew that a cooperation only was intended, and by no means an union
of our object with the fortune of the ex-Bashaw, and the commodore's
letters of March 22 and May 19 prove that he had the most correct idea
of our intentions. His verbal instructions, indeed, to Mr. Eaton and
Captain Hull, if the expressions are accurately committed to writing
by those gentlemen, do not limit the extent of his cooperation as
rigorously as he probably intended; but it is certain from the
ex-Bashaw's letter of January 3, written when he was proceeding to join
Mr. Eaton, and in which he says, "Your operations should be carried on
by sea, mine by land," that he left the position in which he was with a
proper idea of the nature of the cooperation. If Mr. Eaton's subsequent
convention should appear to bring forward other objects, his letter of
April 29 and May 1 views this convention but as provisional, the second
article, as he expressly states, guarding it against any ill effect; and
his letter of June 30 confirms this construction.

In the event it was found that after placing the ex-Bashaw in possession
of Derne, one of the most important cities and provinces of the country,
where he had resided himself as governor, lie was totally unable to
command any resources or to bear any part in cooperation with us. This
hope was then at an end, and we certainly had never contemplated, nor
were we prepared, to land an army of our own, or to raise, pay, or
subsist an army of Arabs to march from Derne to Tri