ork to
another; and such interruptions would be more likely to occur in the
case of a long than of a short writing. In all attempts to determine
the chronological he order of the Platonic writings on internal
evidence, this uncertainty about any single Dialogue being composed at
one time is a disturbing element, which must be admitted to affect
longer works, such as the Republic and the Laws, more than shorter
ones. But, on the other hand, the seeming discrepancies of the
Republic may only arise out of the discordant elements which the
philosopher has attempted to unite in a single whole, perhaps without
being himself able to recognize the inconsistency which is obvious to
us. For there is a judgment of after ages which few great writers have
ever been able to anticipate for themselves. They do not perceive the
want of connection in their own writings, or the gaps in their systems
which are visible enough to those who come after them. In the
beginnings of literature and philosophy, amid the first efforts of
thought and language, more inconsistencies occur than now, when the
paths of speculation are well worn and the meaning of words precisely
defined. For consistency, too, is the growth of time; and some of the
greatest creations of the human mind have been wanting in unity. Tried
by this test, several of the Platonic Dialogues, according to our
modern ideas, appear to be defective, but the deficiency is no proof
that they were composed at different times or by different hands. And
the supposition that the Republic was written uninterruptedly and by a
continuous effort is in some degree confirmed by the numerous
references from one part of the work to another.

The second title, "Concerning Justice," is not the one by which the
Republic is quoted, either by Aristotle or generally in antiquity, and,
like the other second titles of the Platonic Dialogues, may therefore
be assumed to be of later date. Morgenstern and others have asked
whether the definition of justice, which is the professed aim, or the
construction of the State is the principal argument of the work. The
answer is, that the two blend in one, and are two faces of the same
truth; for justice is the order of the State, and the State is the
visible embodiment of justice under the conditions of human society.
The one is the soul and the other is the body, and the Greek ideal of
the State, as of the individual, is a fair mind in a fair body. In
Hegel