. When they unite whatever
consecutive aspects are most significant and at the same time easiest
to copy, they are in the clutches of their cubic experience, and what
they are indifferent about, perhaps unconscious of, is the
_two-dimensional_ appearance which a body presents when its parts are
seen simultaneously and therefore from a single point of view. The
progress of painting is always from representing the Consecutive to
representing the Simultaneous; perspective, foreshortening, and later,
light and shade, being the scientific and technical means towards
this end.

Upon our knowledge of the precise stage of such pictorial
development depends our correct recognition of what things, and
particularly what spatial relations and locomotion, of things, the
painter is intended to represent. Thus when a Byzantine
draughtsman puts his figures in what look to us as superposed tiers,
he is merely trying to convey their existence behind one another on
a common level. And what we take for the elaborate contortions of
athletes and Athenas on Sixth Century vases turns out to be nothing
but an archaic representation of ordinary walking and running.

The suggestion of locomotion depends furthermore on anatomy.
What the figures of a painting are intended to be doing, what they
are intended to have just done and to be going to do, in fact all
questions about their action and business, are answered by reference
to their bodily structure and its real or supposed possibilities. The
same applies to expression of mood.

The impassiveness of archaic Apollos is more likely to be due to
anatomical difficulties in displacing arms and legs, than to lack of
emotion on the part of artists who were, after all, contemporaries
either of Sappho or Pindar. And it is more probable that the
sculptors of Aegina were still embarrassed about the modelling of
lips and cheeks than that, having Homer by heart, they imagined his
heroes to die silently and with a smirk.

I have entered into this question of perspective and anatomy, and
given the above examples, because they will bring home to the
reader one of the chief principles deduced from our previous
examination into the psychology of our subject, namely that _all
thinking about things is thinking away from the Shapes suggesting
those things, since it involves knowledge which the Shapes in
themselves do not afford._ And I have insisted particularly upon the
dependence of representations of locomo