on of God ought to have assumed this.

Obj. 3: Further, human nature was not assumed by the Son of God in
the concrete as is signified by the word "man," as was said above (A.
3). Now in this way it signifies human nature as it is in
individuals, as is plain from what has been said (A. 3). Therefore
the Son of God assumed human nature as it is separated from
individuals.

_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11): "God the
Word Incarnate did not assume a nature which exists in pure thought;
for this would have been no Incarnation, but a false and fictitious
Incarnation." But human nature as it is separated or abstracted from
individuals is "taken to be a pure conception, since it does not
exist in itself," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 11).
Therefore the Son of God did not assume human nature, as it is
separated from individuals.

_I answer that,_ The nature of man or of any other sensible thing,
beyond the being which it has in individuals, may be taken in two
ways: first, as if it had being of itself, away from matter, as the
Platonists held; secondly, as existing in an intellect either human
or Divine. Now it cannot subsist of itself, as the Philosopher proves
(Metaph. vii, 26, 27, 29, 51), because sensible matter belongs to the
specific nature of sensible things, and is placed in its definition,
as flesh and bones in the definition of man. Hence human nature
cannot be without sensible matter. Nevertheless, if human nature were
subsistent in this way, it would not be fitting that it should be
assumed by the Word of God. First, because this assumption is
terminated in a Person, and it is contrary to the nature of a common
form to be thus individualized in a person. Secondly, because to a
common nature can only be attributed common and universal operations,
according to which man neither merits nor demerits, whereas, on the
contrary, the assumption took place in order that the Son of God,
having assumed our nature, might merit for us. Thirdly, because a
nature so existing would not be sensible, but intelligible. But the
Son of God assumed human nature in order to show Himself in men's
sight, according to Baruch 3:38: "Afterwards He was seen upon earth,
and conversed with men."

Likewise, neither could human nature have been assumed by the Son of
God, as it is in the Divine intellect, since it would be none other
than the Divine Nature; and, according to this, human nature would be
in the S