perations against Jerusalem.

"On the 7th the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost
continuous. The hills were covered with mist at frequent intervals
throughout the fighting, rendering observation from the air and visual
signalling impossible." Great was the discomfort caused to the men by
this rain, fog and mud. The cold was intense, and soldiers who had borne
the brunt of a long day's fighting could not sleep, but just lay huddled
together longing for the dawn. An even more serious effect of the rain
was to jeopardise the supply arrangements, by converting the roads into
seas of liquid mud, rendering them almost impassable, in places quite
impassable for camels and mechanical transport.

By dawn on the 8th, all the troops were in their allotted positions,
except the 53rd Division. It had been recognized that these troops on
the extreme right might be delayed and fail to reach the positions
assigned to them by dawn on the 8th, and arrangements had accordingly
been made for the protection of our right flank west of Jerusalem in
case of such delay occurring. This contingency did occur. The 53rd
Division was held up by mud and fog, and by roads blown up by the enemy,
so that, by the morning of the 8th, it was still some distance south of
Jerusalem; on that day it exercised little or no influence on the
fighting.

During the darkness of the night of the 7th/8th December, and in weather
such as we have described, portions of the 60th Division clambered down
the mountain side, crossed the deep wadi bed in front of the right of
our line, and crept up the steep terraced sides of the opposite ridge
where ran a portion of the Turkish line. One brigade was to make a
frontal attack, while another was to turn the left flank of the enemy's
position, by scaling a spur to the south-west of the village of Ain
Karim. These two brigades stormed the main line of works before daylight
and captured the western defences of Jerusalem. Considerable rifle and
artillery fire was experienced from the outskirts of Jerusalem, so that
it was necessary for our troops to throw back their right and form a
defensive flank facing eastwards towards the city. Artillery support
from our own guns soon became difficult, owing to the length of the
advance and the difficulty of moving guns forward. It thus became
difficult for these troops to attain their subsequent objectives in the
direction of the Nablus road north of Jerusalem. Accordingly, i