ed of a substantially
continuous line from the sea at Gaza to Arab el Teeaha, where the left
flank was bent back or "refused" at or about Sheria. Some 4-1/2 miles
farther on were the detached works covering Beersheba, which thus
constituted a strong outwork protecting the left flank of the main
position. The decisive blow was to be struck against the left flank of
the main Turkish position at Hareira and Sheria. Before this blow could
be struck, it was necessary to clear away the obstacle presented by
Beersheba. It was also necessary to keep the enemy in doubt as to where
the decisive blow was to fall; so another operation, on as large a scale
as the available force would permit, and calculated both to mystify the
enemy and to draw off a portion of his reserves, was undertaken on the
immediate sea front at Gaza. Thus we get, firstly, the capture of
Beersheba; secondly, the attack on the Gaza coastal defences; and,
thirdly, the main attack delivered against Sheria.
"This plan of operations was chosen for the following reasons. The
enemy's works in the Hareira-Sheria sector were less formidable than
elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the
enemy's defences. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary
to the main operation, in order to secure the water supply at that
place, and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on
the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which
direction the main attack was to be developed. When Beersheba was in our
hands, we should have an open flank against which to operate, and full
use could be made of our superiority in mounted troops. Moreover, a
success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage, and forcing
the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other
line of attack would afford."
The difficulties to be overcome in the operations against Beersheba and
the Hareira-Sheria line were considerable. Foremost among them were our
old friend, the shortage of water, and, scarcely less formidable, the
difficulty of transport.
With regard to water, no supply existed in the area over which
operations were to take place. "An ample supply of water was known to
exist at Beersheba, but it was uncertain how quickly it could be
developed or to what extent the enemy would have damaged the wells
before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large
supply of water would be found till
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