stroyed by starvation and
disease 250,000 Cubans, the majority of them women and children,
reducing the population of the island to 1,100,000 Cubans intent on
independence and 150,000 Spaniards opposed to their having it. The Cuban
army consisted of 25,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry, fairly well armed,
with some artillery. Maximo Gomez was Commander in Chief. Major-General
Calixto Garcia commanded in Camaguey and Oriente, with Pedro Perez,
Jesus Rabi and Mario G. Menocal as his lieutenants. Major-General
Francisco Carrillo commanded in Santa Clara, aided by Jose Rodriguez,
Hijino Esquerra, Jose Miguel Gomez and Jose Gonzales. In the western
three provinces Major-General Jose Maria Rodriguez commanded, with Pedro
Betancourt, Alexandra Rodriguez, Pedro Vias and Juan Lorente as his
chief aids. The civil government of the Republic had been changed
somewhat, Bartolome Maso being President, Domingo Mendez Capote
Vice-President and Secretary of War, Andreas Moreno Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Ernesto Fonts-Sterling Secretary of Finance, and Manuel Silva
Secretary of the Interior. This organization, with its provincial and
municipal subordinates, was performing the functions of government under
great difficulties, yet much more efficiently and to a much wider extent
throughout the island, than the Spanish administration.

The uncompromising attitude of the Revolutionists, and the hopelessness
of any attempt at amicable adjustment of affairs, was at this time
strikingly shown in a tragic incident. It was in December, 1897. There
was in Havana a young Spanish officer named Joaquin Ruiz, who had
formerly served as a civil engineer, and had been intimately associated
with Nestor Aranguren, another young engineer who had become a leader of
the Revolutionists and had made himself particularly active and annoying
to the Spanish in the Province of Havana. The two were close friends,
and were both men of charming personality. The Spanish authorities in
Havana determined to use this friendship in an attempt to seduce
Aranguren into betraying or at least deserting the patriot cause. So
Ruiz was directed to open a correspondence with Aranguren, with a view
to securing a personal interview with him. Aranguren wrote to Ruiz that
he would be glad to meet him personally, but could not do so if he came
on any political errand; and he warned him that for him to come to the
Cuban camp with any proposal of Cuban surrender or acceptance of
autonom