.

Without some general and well-defined principles ascertaining those
objects of internal improvement to which the means of the nation may be
constitutionally applied, it is obvious that the exercise of the power
can never be satisfactory. Besides the danger to which it exposes
Congress of making hasty appropriations to works of the character of
which they may be frequently ignorant, it promotes a mischievous and
corrupting influence upon elections by holding out to the people the
fallacious hope that the success of a certain candidate will make
navigable their neighboring creek or river, bring commerce to their
doors, and increase the value of their property. It thus favors
combinations to squander the treasure of the country upon a multitude of
local objects, as fatal to just legislation as to the purity of public
men.

If a system compatible with the Constitution can not be devised which is
free from such tendencies, we should recollect that that instrument
provides within itself the mode of its amendment, and that there is,
therefore, no excuse for the assumption of doubtful powers by the
General Government. If those which are clearly granted shall be found
incompetent to the ends of its creation, it can at any time apply for
their enlargement; and there is no probability that such an application,
if founded on the public interest, will ever be refused. If the
propriety of the proposed grant be not sufficiently apparent to command
the assent of three-fourths of the States, the best possible reason why
the power should not be assumed on doubtful authority is afforded; for
if more than one-fourth of the States are unwilling to make the grant
its exercise will be productive of discontents which will far
overbalance any advantages that could be derived from it. All must admit
that there is nothing so worthy of the constant solicitude of this
Government as the harmony and union of the people.

Being solemnly impressed with the conviction that the extension of the
power to make internal improvements beyond the limit I have suggested,
even if it be deemed constitutional, is subversive of the best interests
of our country, I earnestly recommend to Congress to refrain from its
exercise in doubtful cases, except in relation to improvements already
begun, unless they shall first procure from the States such an amendment
of the Constitution as will define its character and prescribe its
bounds. If the States feel themselves