e of distrust of the
representative body. Liable as the Confederacy is, from its great
extent, to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to a
corresponding multiplication of candidates for the Presidency, the
tendency of the constitutional reference to the House of Representatives
is to devolve the election upon that body in almost every instance, and,
whatever choice may then be made among the candidates thus presented to
them, to swell the influence of particular interests to a degree
inconsistent with the general good. The consequences of this feature of
the Constitution appear far more threatening to the peace and integrity
of the Union than any which I can conceive as likely to result from the
simple legislative action of the Federal Government.

It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitution to keep as
separate as possible the action of the legislative and executive
branches of the Government. To secure this object nothing is more
essential than to preserve the former from all temptations of private
interest, and therefore so to direct the patronage of the latter as not
to permit such temptations to be offered. Experience abundantly
demonstrates that every precaution in this respect is a valuable
safeguard of liberty, and one which my reflections upon the tendencies
of our system incline me to think should be made still stronger. It was
for this reason that, in connection with an amendment of the
Constitution removing all intermediate agency in the choice of the
President, I recommended some restrictions upon the reeligibility of
that officer and upon the tenure of offices generally. The reason still
exists, and I renew the recommendation with an increased confidence that
its adoption will strengthen those checks by which the Constitution
designed to secure the independence of each department of the Government
and promote the healthful and equitable administration of all the trusts
which it has created. The agent most likely to contravene this design of
the Constitution is the Chief Magistrate. In order, particularly, that
his appointment may as far as possible be placed beyond the reach of any
improper influences; in order that he may approach the solemn
responsibilities of the highest office in the gift of a free people
uncommitted to any other course than the strict line of constitutional
duty, and that the securities for this independence may be rendered as
strong as the nature of power an