dation." And Mr.
Horsman, taking a large general view of the legitimate working of the
parliamentary constitution, argued that, while it was an undoubted rule
that "all taxes should originate with the Commons, as that elective and
more immediately responsible assembly that is constantly referred back
to the constituencies, the reviewing power of a permanent and
independent chamber was no less essential;" and that, considering that
"the Reform Bill of 1832 had given a preponderance of powers to the
Commons, and that the tendency of any farther Reform Act must be in the
same direction, so far from narrowing the field of action for the peers,
the wiser alternative might be to adopt a generous construction of their
powers, with a view to preserving the equilibrium that is held to be
essential to the safety and well-working of the constitution. The House
of Commons," he concluded, "is perpetually assuming fresh powers and
establishing new precedents. Virtually all bills now originate with the
Commons; but this is not the consequence of any aggressive spirit in
them, but is the necessary and inevitable result of the historic working
of the constitution; and so this act of the Lords was but the natural
working of the constitution to meet a definite emergency." The
resolutions were passed, the first and third without a division; the
second, to which an amendment had been proposed, designed to limit the
force of the precedents alleged as justifying the act of the Lords, by a
majority of nearly four hundred.[315] In their form and language the
resolutions cannot be said to have greatly affected the power claimed by
the Lords, and exercised by them in this instance. The first two were
simply declaratory of acknowledged principles or facts, and the third
intimated no desire to guard against anything but an undue exertion by
the Lords of the right which they were admitted to possess. But it can
hardly be doubted that the intention even of Lord Palmerston, dictated
by the strong feeling which he perceived to prevail in the House of
Commons on the subject, was to deter the Lords from any future exercise
of their powers of review and rejection of measures relating to
taxation, when, perhaps, the Commons might be under less prudent
guidance; nor that the effect of the resolutions will correspond with
the design rather than with the language of the mover, and will prevent
the Lords, unless under the pressure of some overpowering necessity,