wever, it secured these benefits for mankind for all time to
come, the Roman political system in itself was one which could not
possibly endure. That extension of the franchise which made Rome's
conquests possible, was, after all, the extension of a franchise which
could only be practically enjoyed within the walls of the imperial city
itself. From first to last the device of representation was never
thought of, and from first to last the Roman _comitia_ remained a
primary assembly. The result was that, as the burgherhood enlarged, the
assembly became a huge mob as little fitted for the transaction of
public business as a town-meeting of all the inhabitants of New York
would be. The functions which in Athens were performed by the assembly
were accordingly in Rome performed largely by the aristocratic senate;
and for the conflicts consequently arising between the senatorial and
the popular parties it was difficult to find any adequate constitutional
check. Outside of Italy, moreover, in the absence of a representative
system, the Roman government was a despotism which, whether more or less
oppressive, could in the nature of things be nothing else than a
despotism. But nothing is more dangerous for a free people than the
attempt to govern a dependent people despotically. The bad government
kills out the good government as surely as slave-labour destroys
free-labour, or as a debased currency drives out a sound currency. The
existence of proconsuls in the provinces, with great armies at their
beck and call, brought about such results as might have been predicted,
as soon as the growing anarchy at home furnished a valid excuse for
armed interference. In the case of the Roman world, however, the result
is not to be deplored, for it simply substituted a government that was
practicable under the circumstances for one that had become demonstrably
impracticable.

As regards the provinces the change from senatorial to imperial
government at Rome was a great gain, inasmuch as it substituted an
orderly and responsible administration for irregular and irresponsible
extortion. For a long time, too, it was no part of the imperial policy
to interfere with local customs and privileges. But, in the absence of a
representative system, the centralizing tendency inseparable from the
position of such a government proved to be irresistible. And the
strength of this centralizing tendency was further enhanced by the
military character of the gov