e, information, or
belief in the existence of such a conspiracy. I am disposed to take his
answer as being as broad as though he had put it in these words. And now,
I ask, even if he had done so, have not I a right to prove it on him, and
to offer the evidence of more than two witnesses, by whom to prove it; and
if the evidence proves the existence of the conspiracy, does his broader
answer denying all knowledge, information, or belief, disturb the fact?
It can only show that he was used by conspirators, and was not a leader of
them.
Now, in regard to his reminding me of the moral rule that persons who tell
what they do not know to be true falsify as much as those who knowingly
tell falsehoods. I remember the rule, and it must be borne in mind that
in what I have read to you, I do not say that I know such a conspiracy
to exist. To that I reply, I believe it. If the Judge says that I do not
believe it, then he says what he does not know, and falls within his
own rule, that he who asserts a thing which he does not know to be true,
falsifies as much as he who knowingly tells a falsehood. I want to call
your attention to a little discussion on that branch of the case, and the
evidence which brought my mind to the conclusion which I expressed as
my belief. If, in arraying that evidence I had stated anything which was
false or erroneous, it needed but that Judge Douglas should point it out,
and I would have taken it back, with all the kindness in the world. I do
not deal in that way. If I have brought forward anything not a fact, if he
will point it out, it will not even ruffle me to take it back. But if he
will not point out anything erroneous in the evidence, is it not rather
for him to show, by a comparison of the evidence, that I have reasoned
falsely, than to call the "kind, amiable, intelligent gentleman" a liar?
If I have reasoned to a false conclusion, it is the vocation of an
able debater to show by argument that I have wandered to an erroneous
conclusion. I want to ask your attention to a portion of the Nebraska
Bill, which Judge Douglas has quoted:
"It being the true intent and meaning of this Act, not to
legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and
regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States."
Thereupon Judge Douglas and others began to argue in favor of "
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