American panics the foreign world markets were counted
upon to come to the rescue and break the fall. Imports of gold,
foreign loans, and foreign buying were safeguards which in past crises
had been counted upon to prevent utter disaster. On this occasion our
market stood by itself unaided; an unthinkable convulsion had seized
the world; panic had spread; even the bargain hunter was chilled by
the unprecedented conditions; there were practically no buyers. A half
hour's session of the Exchange that morning would have brought on a
complete collapse in prices; a general insolvency of brokerage houses
would have forced the suspension of all business; the banks, holding
millions of unsaleable collateral, would have become involved; many
big institutions would have failed and a run on savings banks would
have begun. It is idle to speculate upon what the final outcome might
have been. Suffice it to say that these grave consequences were
prevented in the nick of time by the prompt and determined action of
the Stock Exchange, and by that alone.

* * * * *

Any decisive step whether right or wrong always finds its critics.
There were a few people who criticised the Exchange for closing too
soon and thought that the feeling of panic was increased by this
action. These few were mostly converted from their opinions as the
situation became clearer. There was a larger number who took the
ground that the Exchange had not closed soon enough, and urged that
had the step been taken a few days sooner a considerable decline in
values would have been prevented. It is strange that the latter
critics did not stop to reflect on how great an advantage it was, all
through the anxious days of August, to have had the New York market
liquidated as far as it could be without disaster, and the level of
closing prices relatively low. How vastly greater would have been the
task of safeguarding the situation in the face of declining prices in
the "New Street Market" had the closing prices on the Exchange been
ten or fifteen points higher. The truth is that the Exchange was
closed at the very best possible moment. The market was kept open as
long as liquidation could safely be carried on (thus immensely
diminishing the pressure to be withstood during the suspension) and it
was closed at the very instant that a collapse was threatened.

The above facts suggest some reflections with regard to the agitation
for governmenta