ing to the brokerage fraternity because
it discloses the fact that, even in the midst of a calamity so great
that no individual could feel himself beyond the reach of insolvency,
the impulse to succor the unfortunate remained as strong as ever among
them.

CHAPTER III

THE REOPENING OF THE EXCHANGE

The fact that the Stock Exchange closed on July 31st and did not
reopen fully until December 15th, might lead to the supposition that
the question of reopening was not taken up before December. Far from
this being the case, the truth is that reopening began to be discussed
immediately after the institution was closed. Within twenty-four hours
of the closing the minority, who had not been at first convinced of
the wisdom of that action, joined with the majority in urgently
advising that the Exchange be not reopened soon. All through the month
of August a growing anxiety over the possibility of some hasty action
by the Exchange authorities showed itself among brokers, bankers, and
even some government officials. For this anxiety there was never any
basis, because the officers of the Exchange having exceptional means
of knowing what the dangers were, had no intention of assuming the
immense responsibilities of re-establishing the market without the
backing and approval of the entire banking fraternity. Gradually the
excited solicitude about a premature reopening subsided as the
ultra-conservative attitude of the Exchange was understood, and this
was followed ere long by the first symptoms of agitation for the
establishment of some form of restricted market.

As we have already shown the restraints of July 31st were relaxed one
by one with the lapse of time. First a market at or above the closing
prices was organized under the Committee on Clearing House; then
Committees to facilitate trading in listed and unlisted bonds were
formed; and finally a market was provided for unlisted stocks. All
these devices, however, while they brought about readjustment and
diminution of strain, did not constitute a reopening of the Stock
Exchange, and the restoration of that great primary market, in some
restricted way, became more and more a subject of public interest and
concern.

As we have seen, the fundamental reason for closing the Exchange was
that America, when the war broke out, was in debt to Europe, and that
Europe was sure to enforce the immediate payment of that debt in order
to put herself in funds to prosecute this