ny nation is not, how
much it has; but whether it is in a form that can be used, and in the
possession of persons who can use it.]

CHAPTER II.

STORE-KEEPING.

31. The first chapter having consisted of little more than definition of
terms, I purpose, in this, to expand and illustrate the given
definitions.

The view which has here been taken of the nature of wealth, namely, that
it consists in an intrinsic value developed by a vital power, is
directly opposed to two nearly universal conceptions of wealth. In the
assertion that value is primarily intrinsic, it opposes the idea that
anything which is an object of desire to numbers, and is limited in
quantity, so as to have rated worth in exchange, may be called, or
virtually become, wealth. And in the assertion that value is,
secondarily, dependent upon power in the possessor, it opposes the idea
that the worth of things depends on the demand for them, instead of on
the use of them. Before going farther, we will make these two positions
clearer.

32. I. First. All wealth is intrinsic, and is not constituted by the
judgment of men. This is easily seen in the case of things affecting the
body; we know, that no force of fantasy will make stones nourishing, or
poison innocent; but it is less apparent in things affecting the mind.
We are easily--perhaps willingly--misled by the appearance of beneficial
results obtained by industries addressed wholly to the gratification of
fanciful desire; and apt to suppose that whatever is widely coveted,
dearly bought, and pleasurable in possession, must be included in our
definition of wealth. It is the more difficult to quit ourselves of this
error because many things which are true wealth in moderate use, become
false wealth in immoderate; and many things are mixed of good and
evil,--as mostly, books, and works of art,--out of which one person Will
get the good, and another the evil; so that it seems as if there were
no fixed good or evil in the things themselves, but only in the view
taken, and use made of them.

But that is not so. The evil and good are fixed; in essence, and in
proportion. And in things in which evil depends upon excess, the point
of excess, though indefinable, is fixed; and the power of the thing is
on the hither side for good, and on the farther side for evil. And in
all cases this power is inherent, not dependent on opinion or choice.
Our thoughts of things neither make, nor mar their eternal force