od, that condemned fetishism; and this conception it was,
which was to prove eventually the condemnation of polytheism. A
multitude of beings--even though they be divine beings--means a
multitude, that is a diversity, of ideas. Diversity of ideas,
difference of opinion, is what is implied by every mythology which
tells of disputes and wars between the gods. Every god, who thus
disputed and fought with other gods, must have felt that he had right
on his side, or else have fought for the sake of fighting.
Consequently the gods of polytheism are either destitute of morality,
or divided in opinion as to what is right. In neither case, therefore,
are the gods, of whom mythology tells, the beings, superior to man,
who, from the beginning, were present in the common consciousness to
be worshipped. From the outset, the object of the community's worship
had been conceived as a moral power. If, then, the many gods of
polytheism were either destitute or disregardful of morality, they
could not be the moral power of which the common consciousness had
been dimly aware: that moral power, that moral personality, must be
other than they. As the moral consciousness of the community
discriminated fetishes from gods and tended to rule out fetishes from
the sphere of religion; so too, eventually, the moral consciousness of
the community came to be offended by the incompatibility between the
moral ideal and the conception of a multitude of gods at variance with
each other. If the common consciousness was slow in coming to
recognise the unity of the Godhead--and it was slower in some people
than in others--the unity was logically implied, from the beginning,
in the conception of a personal power, greater and higher than man,
and having the good of the community at heart. The history of religion
is, in effect, from one point of view, the story of the process by
which this conception, however dim, blurred or vague, at first, tends
to become clarified and self-consistent.

That, however, is not the only point of view from which the history of
religion can, or ought to be, regarded. So long as we look at it from
that point of view, we shall be in danger of seeing nothing in the
history of religion but an intellectual process, and nothing in
religion itself but a mental conception. There is, however, another
element in religion, as is generally recognised; and that an emotional
element, as is usually admitted. What however is the nature of that