nor spell. That we may admit. But, then, we may, or
rather must go further: if there were no desire, neither would there
be any action, whatever, performed by man. Men's actions, however,
differ endlessly from one another. They differ partly because men's
desires, themselves, differ; and partly because the means they adopt
to satisfy them differ also. It would be vain to say that different
means cannot be adopted for attaining one and the same end. Equally
vain would it be to say that the various means may not differ from one
another, to the point of incompatibility. If then we regard prayer and
spell as alike means which have been employed by man for the purpose
of realising his desires, we are yet at liberty to maintain that
prayer and spell are different and incompatible.
That there is a difference between prayer and spell--a difference at
any rate great enough to allow the two words to be used in
contradistinction to one another--is clear enough. The cardinal
distinction between the two is also clear: a spell takes effect in
virtue of the power resident in the formula itself or in the person
who utters it; while a prayer is an appeal to a personal power, or to
a power personal enough to be able to listen to the appeal, and to
understand it, and to grant it, if so it seems good. That this
difference obtains between prayer and spell will not be denied by any
student of the science of religion. But if this difference is
admitted, as admitted it must be, it is plain that prayer and spell
are terms which apply to two different moods or states of mind. Desire
is implied by each alike: were there no desire, there would be neither
prayer nor spell. But, whereas prayer is an appeal to some one who has
the power to grant one's desire, spell is the exercise of power which
one possesses oneself, or has at one's command.
That the two moods are different, and are incompatible with one
another, is clear upon the face of it: to beg for a thing as a mercy
or a gift is quite different from commanding that the thing be done.
The whole attitude of mind assumed in the one case is different from
that assumed in the other. It is possible, indeed, to pass from the
one attitude to the other. But it is impossible to say that the one
attitude is the other. It is correct to say that the one attitude may
follow the other. But it is to be misled by language to say that the
one attitude becomes the other. It is possible for one and the same
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