reasons he gives
for his decision to attack:

"Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not
much in inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew
he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the
assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my
anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he did not
prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg
would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted
elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston
from the State. But the first consideration of all was--the troops
believed they could carry the works in their front, and they would
not have worked so patiently in their trenches if they had not been
allowed to try."

Having tried, he now "determined upon a regular siege--to 'outcamp
the enemy,' as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience
of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they
went to work on the defences and approaches with a will."(1)

It has also to be remembered, in any fair and candid consideration
of the subject, that at this comparatively early period of the war
even such bloody lessons as Fredericksburg had not sufficed to
teach either the commanders or their followers on either side,
Federal or Confederate, the full value, computed in time, of even
a simple line of breastworks of low relief, or the cost in blood
of any attempt to eliminate this value of time by carrying the
works at a rush. Indeed, it may be doubted whether, from the
beginning of the war to the end, this reasoning, in spite of all
castigations that resulted from disregarding it, was ever fully
impressed upon the generals of either army, although at last there
came, it is true, a time when, as at Cold Harbor, the men had an
opinion of their own, and chose to act upon it. It is also very
questionable whether earthworks manned by so much as a line of
skirmishers, prepared and determined to defend them, have ever been
successfully assaulted save as the result of a surprise. Sedgwick's
captures of the Rappanhannock redoubts and of Marye's Heights have
indeed been cited as instances to the contrary, yet on closer
consideration it is apparent that although in the former case the
Confederates had been looking for an attack, they had given up all
expectation of being called on to meet it that day, when, just at
sunset, Russell fell suddenly upon