le, and reached
Volshenitsa, the juncture of the trails from Seletskoe and Emtsa, about
noon of the 8th of September.

Four versts beyond Volshenitsa the column passed the scene of the battle
between the Bolos and "B" Force. Gear and carts scattered around and two
or three fresh graves told that this was serious business. A diary of an
American sailor and the memoranda of a British officer, broken off
suddenly on the 30th of August, that were picked up told of the
adventures of the handful of men we were going to hunt. More
explanations of the genesis of this Kodish front is now in order.

Consideration of the map will show that Kodish was of great strategic
Importance. Truth to tell it was of more importance than our High
Command at first estimated. The Bolshevik strategists were always aware
of its value and never permitted themselves to be neglectful of it.
Trotsky knew that the strategy and tactics of the winter campaign would
make good use of the Kodish road. Indeed it was seen in the fall by
General Poole that a Red column from Plesetskaya up the Kodish road was
a wedge between the railroad forces and the river forces, always
imperiling the Vaga and Dvina forces with being cut off if the Reds came
strong enough.

The first movement on Kodish by the Allied troops had been made by "B"
force under the command of Col. Hazelden of the British army. With about
two hundred men composed of French soldiers, a few English soldiers,
American sailors from the Olympic, and some local Russian volunteers, he
had pushed up the Dvina and Vaga to Seletskoe and operating from there
had sent a party of French even as far as Emtsa River, a few miles north
of Kodish.

But before he could attack Kodish, Hazelden was ordered to strike across
the forest area and attack the Reds in the rear near Obozerskaya where
the Bolshevik rear guard with its excellent artillery strategist was
stubbornly holding the Allied Force "A." Passing through Seletskoe he
left the Russian volunteers to oppose the Reds in Kodish, and guard his
rear. But these uncertain troops fled upon approach of the Bolos and
about the first of September Col. Hazelden instead of being in a
position to demoralize the Reds on the railroad by a swift blow from
behind, found himself in desperate defense, both front and rear, and
beleagured in the woods and swamps some twenty-seven versts east of
Obozerskaya.

He managed to get a message through to Sisskoe just before the Reds