having succeeded
in crossing the river, was moved forward to tender battle. Late
in the afternoon I was ordered to dislodge the enemy from a hill
(Miller's) about two miles in front of Brandy Station. The place
was held by artillery and infantry, flanked by cavalry. This was
Lee's most advanced position, and it was held firmly as a point of
observation. My command was disposed for the attack in the following
order: The 138th Pennsylvania (Colonel McClennan) was moved on
the left of the railroad to threaten the enemy on his right; the
122d Ohio (Colonel W. H. Ball) followed in support. The 110th Ohio
(Lieutenant-Colonel Foster) was put on the right of the railroad,
with orders to move directly on the height occupied by the enemy;
the 6th Maryland (Colonel John W. Horn) in support, but some distance
to the right. There was no artillery at hand, and the attack was
ordered at once. The distance to the hill was about one half mile.
The 138th drew the enemy's artillery fire, but continued its advance.
The 6th pushed forward into a wood on the right to make a demonstration,
and in person I led the 110th to the real work. Not a gun was
fired by my men as they advanced to the charge. I made every
exertion possible to hasten the troops, but when they reached the
foot of the hill the enemy's artillery was withdrawn, and his
infantry made a precipitate retreat. I was the first to gain the
crest, being mounted, and with pistol fired on the retiring troops
not two hundred feet away. A Confederate was reported wounded with
a pistol ball at this place. This is the nearest I can come to
having personally injured, in any way, any person in battle. We
pushed on to Brandy Station without further orders, driving the
enemy until we met a more formidable force, with several batteries
of artillery, which compelled us to halt. Night came on, and the
day's work ended by our going into bivouac at the Station. Captain
Andress of the 138th was the only officer of my command killed,
and my loss was otherwise light. We made the charge with the
commanding General--Meade--and much of his army looking on. It
was Meade's belief that behind the heights assaulted would be found
Lee's army arrayed for battle.

Though Lee had selected a strong position (as already stated) in
front of Culpeper Court-House, and fortified it somewhat, he decided
it was not a good one, and therefore declined battle north of the
Rapidan,(11) and, by the mornin