yed his
men busily for the succeeding two hours in throwing up lunettes or
redans to cover his field guns. His men were skillfully posted
behind stone fences, common in the Valley, and on portions of his
line behind temporary breastworks.

Early, before 12 P.M., wired Richmond he had won a complete victory,
and would drive the Union Army across the Potomac. At 4 P.M. our
army went forward in single line, with no considerable reserves,
but in splendid style. Getty, with his left still on the turnpike,
was the division of direction. My orders were to hold my left on
Getty's right. Wheaton was to keep connection with my right, and
the Nineteenth Corps with the right of the Sixth Corps; and the
cavalry, Merritt east of Middletown and Custer on Cedar Creek, to
cover the flanks. In verifying my position just before starting,
I found troops of Hayes' command filling a space of two or three
hundred yards between Getty's right and my left. I discovered
Hayes temporarily resting on the ground a short distance in rear
of his men, with his staff around him. From him I learned he had
no orders to advance, whereupon I requested him to withdraw his
men so I could close the interval before the movement commenced.
He promptly rose, mounted his horse, and said: "If this army goes
forward I will fill that gap, with or without orders." Unfortunately,
orders came to him to withdraw, and with others of his corps (Eighth)
form in reserve near the turnpike. His withdrawal left, at the
last moment, a gap which could only be filled by obliqueing my
division to the left as it was moving forward. This produced some
unsteadiness in the line, and the right brigade (Emerson's) continued
the movement too long, causing some massing of troops in the centre
of the division, and some disorder resulted while they were under
a severe infantry and artillery fire. This necessary movement also
caused an interval between Wheaton's division and mine, thereby
imperilling my right. Our attack, however, was not checked until
we had gone forward about one mile. The enemy's centre was driven
back upon his partially intrenched line on the heights mentioned.
This brought my division under a most destructive fire of artillery
and infantry from front and flanks. My right flank was especially
exposed, as it had gone forward farther than the troops on the
right.

The loss in the division was severe, and it became impossible to
hold the exposed troops to