number killed and wounded in this battle is far below that in
some other great battles of the Rebellion, yet the loss for the
Union Army alone was only a little below the aggregate like losses
in the American army from Lexington to Yorktown (1775-1781), and
approximately the same as in the American army in the Mexican War,
from Palo Alto to the City of Mexico (1846-1848).(30)

If either of two things had not occurred prior to the battle, the
result of it might have been different. Had Early not precipitated
an attack with an infantry division and Rosser's cavalry on the
13th of October, Wright, with the Sixth Corps, would have gone to
Petersburg; and had the _fake_ (Longstreet) dispatch of the 16th
not been flagged from the Confederate signal station on Three Top
Mountain, Torbert, with the cavalry, would have been east of the
Blue Ridge on the intended raid. But for the Longstreet dispatch,
Sheridan most likely would have tarried in Washington or delayed
his movements on his return trip. Could the Sixth Corps, could
the cavalry, or could Sheridan have been spared from the battle?

The principal peculiarities of the engagement were: (1) That an
ably commanded army was surprised in its camp, and, in considerable
part, driven from it at the opening of the battle; (2) that
notwithstanding this, it won, at the close of the day, the most
signal and complete field-victory of the war, with the possible
exception of those won at Nashville and Sailor's Creek; (3) the
Confederate Army was destroyed, so there was no battle for the
morrow. In most instances during the Rebellion, it transpired that
the defeated army sullenly retired only a short way in condition
to renew the fight.

Cedar Creek, in some respects, bears a striking analogy to Marengo.
Both were dual in character, each two battles in one day; the
victors of the morning being the defeated and routed of the evening.
Sheridan's victory over Early, like that of Napoleon over Marshal
Melas, left no further fighting for the victors the next day. In
one other respect, also, the comparison holds good. The commander
of each of the finally routed armies sent a message about the middle
of the day of battle announcing to his government a great victory,
to be followed at sunset with the news of a most signal disaster.

In other respects, how dissimilar? Napoleon was, from the opening
to the close of Marengo, on the field, commanding in person, sharing
the defeat, then