and, before the end of the year, he
was sailing for Calcutta as Governor-General of India.

In some ways he was able to fill the place without great effort. He had
never been a respecter of persons; he had been quite indifferent
whether his decisions were approved by those about him, and had always
learnt to walk alone with a single eye to the public good. Also, he had
such vast store of knowledge of the land and its inhabitants as no
Viceroy before him for many decades. But the ceremonial fatigued him;
and the tradition of working 'in Council', as the Viceroy must, was
embarrassing to one who could always form a decision alone and had
learnt to trust his own judgement.

Many of Lawrence's best friends and most trusted colleagues had left
India, and he had, seated at his Council board, others who did not share
his views, and who opposed the measures that he advocated. Especially
was this true of the distinguished soldier Sir Hugh Rose; and Lawrence
had to endure the same strain as in 1850, in the days of the Punjab
board. But he was able to do great service to the country in many ways,
and especially to the agricultural classes by pushing forward large
schemes of irrigation. Finance was one of his strong points, and any
expenditure which would be reproductive was sure of his support owing to
his care for the peasants and his love of a sound budget. The period of
his Viceroyalty was what is generally called uneventful--that is, it was
chiefly given up to such schemes as promoted peace and prosperity, and
did not witness any extension of our dominions. Even when Robert
Napier's[19] expedition went to Abyssinia, few people in England
realized that it was organized in India and paid for by India; and the
credit for its success was given elsewhere.

[Note 19: Created Lord Napier of Magdala after storming King
Theodore's fortress in 1868.]

But it is necessary to refer to one great subject of controversy, which
was prominent all through Lawrence's career and with which his name is
associated. This is the 'Frontier Policy' and the treatment of
Afgh[=a]nist[=a]n, on which two distinct schools of thought emerged.
One school, ever jealous of the Russian advance, maintained that our
Indian Government should establish agencies in Afgh[=a]nist[=a]n with or
without the consent of the Am[=i]r; that it should interfere, if need
be, to secure the throne for a prince who was attached to us; that
British troops should be stationed be