that force is non-moral in
character, and that the only moral question involved in its use is
whether or not the purposes for which it is employed are "good" or
"bad." They fail to realize that these concepts themselves arise from a
subjective set of values, different for every social group on the basis
of its own tradition and for every individual on the basis of his own
experience and training.

The "absolute" pacifist places at the very apex of his scale of values
respect for every human personality so great that he cannot inflict
injury on any human being regardless of the circumstances in which he
finds himself. He would rather himself suffer what he considers to be
injustice, or even see other innocent people suffer it, than to arrogate
to himself the right of sitting in judgment on his fellow men and
deciding that they must be destroyed through his action. For him to
inflict injury or death upon any human being would be to commit the
greatest iniquity of which he can conceive, and would create within his
own soul a sense of guilt so great that acceptance of any other evil
would be preferable to it.

The person who acts on the basis of such a scale of values is not
primarily concerned with the outward expediency of his action in turning
the evil-doer into new ways, although he is happy if his action does
have incidental desirable results. He acts as he does because of a deep
conviction about the nature of the universe in which all men are
brothers, and in which every personality is sacred. No logical argument
to act otherwise can appeal to him unless it is based upon assumptions
arising out of this conviction.

Those who place their primary moral emphasis upon respect for human
personality are led to hold many other values as well as their supreme
value of refusing to use violence against their fellow men. Except in
time of war, when governments insist that their citizens take part in
mass violence, the absolute pacifist is apt to serve these other values,
which he shares with many non-pacifists, without attracting the
attention which distinguishes him from other men of goodwill. He insists
only that in serving these subsidiary values he must not act in any way
inconsistent with his highest value.

Many pacifists, and all non-pacifists, differ from the absolutists in
that they place other values before this supreme respect for every human
personality. The pacifists who do so, refuse to inflict injury on their