intellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions
being, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.
These emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose
deliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise
man, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius
[*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), "it
is not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its
fancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs
disturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by
fear, or depressed with sorrow," in so far as "these passions
forestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or
consenting thereto."

Accordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they
cannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately;
as the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any
movements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man,
in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says
(Ethic. ii, 3) that "some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom
from passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the
assertion should be qualified": they should have said virtue is
freedom from those passions "that are not as they should be as to
manner and time."

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other
examples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own
mind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the
passions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the
Philosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that
virtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that
when he says "a gentle man is not passionate," we are to understand
this of inordinate passion.

Reply Obj. 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings
forward in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iv take the passions in the execution
of reason's command.

Reply Obj. 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as
to prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and
the judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through
being commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's
command.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]

Whether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that s